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ABSTRACT: This article analyses the changes in the organization of labour during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in colonial Charcas, present-day Bolivia,
focusing on the role that different colonial authorities played in this process and its
consequences. The Spanish took advantage of the pre-Hispanic organization of
labour from the beginning of their conquest. However, in a colonial context, labour
relations changed significantly, and the architect of those alterations was Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo. We examine the transformations in mine labour carried out
by the Spanish colonial polity; these had a significant effect not only on mining, but
also on all labour relations in the southern colonial Andes.
INTRODUCTION
This article analyses changes in the organization of labour during the first
two colonial centuries, focusing on the role played by the different colonial
authorities in this process and its consequences. Our starting point is the
reforms carried out by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo during the 1570s, while
we also consider past labour organization. This allows us to cast light on the
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role the colonial authorities played in labour relations and how that role
changed during Toledo’s rule. Engaging with the broader framework of this
special issue, we suggest that those colonial authorities were mobilizers and
allocators of labour; only occasionally were they direct employers.
In this article, we understand Charcas – a term with multiple meanings –
in an operative way sensu Barnadas:1 a historically cohesive territory, the
central force of which was Potosí. Between 1542 and 1776, Charcas was
included in the Peruvian Viceroyalty and, after 1561, it was the centre of the
jurisdiction of the Royal Audience of Charcas (supreme court of justice).
The geographical scope of our study extends from Lake Titicaca in the
north to the southern border of present-day Bolivia, excluding those indi-
genous territories on the eastern lowlands that were not under external
control at that time (Figure 1). This complex territory, inhabited by a range
of ethnic groups, was conquered by the Incas during the fifteenth century
and during the 1530s by the Spanish. The relationship those groups had
with the Incas, and later on with the Spanish, varied from war to alliance,
and the first colonial decades were especially conflictive.
Although mining activities began with the Spanish conquest, the
exploitation of the most important centre, Potosí, did not get underway
until 1545, in the context of the civil war among the conquerors. In 1548,
the Crown managed to put an end to the rebellion, but the power of the
local Spanish lords did not diminish until the arrival of the fifth Viceroy of
Peru, Francisco de Toledo (1569–1581). Before Toledo, the Crown had
granted privileges to particular Spaniards who had actually carried out the
conquest. They were given rights (encomienda) to obtain tributes from
the indigenous peoples, paid in the form of goods, silver, gold, labour, or
personal services.
In this article, we focus especially on the changes made to the indigenous
tributary system and on the forced mine labour, known as mita, which
Toledo introduced for the Potosí silver mines and mills. Here, we want to
stress one of the changes introduced by Toledo, namely dividing indigenous
obligations into two: all indigenous tributaries (men between eighteen
and fifty years’ old) had to pay a monetary tribute to the Crown, and a
proportion of those men had to work for Spaniards, mainly in mining
activities, for a specific period of time (mita). The mita was a state-
coordinated form of draft labour that influenced the lives of the majority
of the indigenous population in Charcas, as we will see. These changes were
central to the evolution of labour relations in the following century.
The seventeenth century saw a massive process of migration of
indigenous peoples, caused by the changes mentioned above, since they
were forced to obtain money to pay the tributes or to pay for a replacement
1. Josep M. Barnadas, Charcas, orígenes históricos de una sociedad colonial (La Paz, 1973).
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Figure 1. Charcas during the seventeenth century.
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for the mita, or alternatively responded by running away from their ethnic
authorities or colonial obligations. Despite migration posing complications
concerning the payment of tributes, as well as concerning the observance of
the mining mita system, the colonial authorities did not respond. We argue
that an important causal factor in this official reticence was the fact that this
massive indigenous migration process favoured the private acquisition of
labour by the Spanish owners of other mines and haciendas, as well as of
other productive activities. Hence, we examine the changes carried out to
mine labour by the Spanish colonial polity and its consequences not only
for mining, but also for all labour relations in the southern colonial Andes.
We have analysed a range of concepts, including tribute, payment, and
free labour, within the framework of the taxonomy of labour relations
developed by the Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations
(Collaboratory). In our final section, we will reflect upon the changes
in labour relations in the light of this taxonomy.
INIT IAL ORGANIZATION OF COLONIAL LABOUR
This section focuses on those aspects of the colonial labour organization
that were reformed by Viceroy Toledo in the 1570s, and that, later on,
constituted a model that continued to operate throughout the seventeenth
century. The early colonial organization of labour in the Peruvian
Viceroyalty was based partly on two important defining aspects: first,
indirect rule, and second pre-existent, although substantively changed,
forms of labour organization. As we will discuss in the final section, indirect
rule implied a combination of two different types of labour relations. The
first was between the beneficiary of the indigenous obligations (which
could be an individual Spaniard, the Crown, or the church) and the native
authorities responsible for those obligations that their communities had to
fulfil. The second type was between the local native authorities and their
people. This was the organizational key: indigenous people went to work in
the mines or on the coca lands, paid their tributes in silver, or did whatever
they had to, because of the relationship they had with the native authorities
(Spanish: caciques)2 based on different types of reciprocity.
The Spanish took advantage of the Inca tributary system. According to
Murra,3 before the conquest, all communities had to provide male and
female labour to periodically perform a range of different tasks; they had to
produce goods for the Inca authorities or for their own local authorities,
and goods – offerings – for the gods. However, men from a specific group,
2. There were different levels of native authorities, and their regional names varied (curacas,
hilacatas, mallku), but here we use the term cacique, meaning all those authorities collectively.
3. John V. Murra, La organización económica del Estado inca (Mexico, 1989 [1978]).
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the yana, were in a different position, since they were separated from their
communities and native authorities and were placed in the service of the
Incas themselves, or in the service of other authorities.4 Their children
inherited their status, and they were not obliged to perform the same
periodic tasks that other natives were required to. This pre-Hispanic
distinction between natives belonging to a community and the yanas
persisted after the conquest, although in a colonial system.
What specific mechanisms were used by the Spanish to recruit native
labour for their enterprises during the first few decades of the conquest?
In general terms, indigenous slavery was forbidden soon after the
demographic collapse in the Caribbean islands. The most widespread form
of labour recruitment, especially in the Peruvian Viceroyalty, was the
encomienda, legitimized by the Crown. This royally sanctioned institution
entailed some of those Spaniards taking part in the conquest acquiring
rights to receive tributes from a native authority and from any people
subjected to it. In return, the beneficiary had to promote their welfare and
guarantee that the indigenous people would embrace Christianity. The
beneficiary was also obliged to contribute to the military defence of his
jurisdiction of residence.5 Indigenous people were obliged to pay tributes in
the form of goods, silver, gold, labour, or personal services. Right from the
beginning, then, the Spanish could access the labour, and sometimes the
capital, needed to develop agricultural, mining, and ranching enterprises.6
Most encomiendas benefited individuals, though a few were under the
direct control of the Crown.
The second form of labour recruitment, which was present only in the
Peruvian Viceroyalty, was the yanaconazgo. Although the yana population
has its origins in the pre-Hispanic period, its significance changed
completely during colonial times. Since the earliest decades of the conquest,
they were a kind of servant and were not present in other regions – such as
Mexico – at least not in the same number.7 There were different types of
yanaconas, working for individuals, for the Crown, or for the church,
although the largest group were those attached to the land, working on
Spanish haciendas. From 1566, they were obliged to pay tribute in cash to
the Crown, but usually they did not pay at all.
4. John H. Rowe, “Inca Policies and Institutions Relating to the Cultural Unification of the
Empire”, in George A. Collier, Renato I. Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth (eds), The Inca and Aztec
States, 1400–1800: Anthropology and History (New York, 1982), pp. 93–118.
5. Barnadas, Charcas; Ana M. Presta, Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial
(Bolivia). Los encomenderos de La Plata 1550-1600 (Lima, 2000).
6. Teodoro Hampe Martínez, “La Encomienda en el Perú en el siglo XVI”,Histórica, 6:2 (1982),
pp. 173–216; Presta, Encomienda, familia y negocios.
7. Juan and Judith Villamarin, Indian Labor in Mainland Colonial Spanish America (Newark,
DE, 1975).
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We want to stress two aspects of the organization of labour in this
period that are important for our analysis. First, the encomienda implied
a community and its native authority, which mediated the community’s
relationship with the encomendero, being a Spanish individual or the
Crown.8 They preserved their land and their internal socio-political
organization. The native authorities collected and paid their tributes to
the encomendero in the form of silver and goods. Indigenous people
included in the encomienda were also obliged to perform some public and
private tasks, coordinated by their own native authority (such as carrying
post, taking care of the upkeep of roads, building churches, and
providing food for priests). After the extinction of their encomiendas, these
indigenous people became royal tributaries and some of them were
conscripted for the mita. Second, the yanaconas were separated from their
communities; they had no land, nor did they recognize a native authority.9
They had to work for Spanish individuals, in mines, houses, on haciendas,
or for the church. In most cases, they served the Spanish, without
any mediation, but there were also yanaconas working for themselves,
especially in urban contexts. They were not obliged to take part in themita,
nor bound by other collective obligations. Until 1566, the yanaconas did
not have to pay tribute to the Crown.
These two forms of labour organization were the most important in
terms of numbers involved, and because they were official. Moreover, many
of those who belonged to an encomienda were forced to fulfil colonial
obligations only part of their time, depending on the community, the tasks
they had to undertake, and their status. Not all indigenous individuals were
necessarily included in those forms, and in a way they were “free”; there
were some who could work for themselves, the most important of them
being traders and artisans, who were inside the colonial economy but
relatively independent.
MINING AND LABOUR IN THE ANDES : V ICEROY TOLEDO
From the mid-sixteenth century, and almost until the present, the Americas
producedmost of theworld’s silver and gold. Between 1550 and 1800,Mexico
and South America accounted for over eighty per cent of the world’s silver
production, and over seventy per cent of all gold production.10 During the
8. In this article, we understand “community” to be a colonial construction. Some encomiendas,
therefore, did not have the same organization or composition as the pre-Hispanic groups.
9. There were some yanacona authorities in the sixteenth century that emerged in the colonial
context.
10. Harry E. Cross, “South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550–1750”, in
J.F. Richards (ed.), Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds (Durham,
NC, 1983), pp. 397–424.
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Viceroyalty of Peru was notable for
its mining production, while the Viceroyalty of New Spain was the most
important mining region during the eighteenth century. One feature that
distinguished these two places was the centrality of a unique mine in Peru:
Potosí. During its heyday, it accounted for over ninety per cent of the
Viceroyalty’s production. Its silver production was so important that,
even when in decline, it continued to dominate global Spanish-American
production.11 In this section, we focus on the main aspects of the mine labour
system at Potosí, including both free and coercive labour.12 We suggest that,
directly or indirectly, miningwas the activity that organized the colonial labour
world, not only in Charcas, but throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru.
In the context of a Crown besieged by debt, the extraction of precious
metals was a royal priority. Within this context, towards the end of the
sixteenth century Viceroy Toledo introduced a range of reform measures.
Firstly, these reforms aimed to increase Peruvian silver production, which
had started to decline in the 1560s because of the extinction of the high-
grade ores. To achieve this, silver was amalgamated with mercury and a
system of lakes built in order to supply the silver refineries (ingenios).13
Further, a compulsory labour system, the mita, was introduced for Potosí
silver production.14
Secondly, the reforms tried to increase control over the indigenous
population, with varying degrees of success. This was effected through the
so-called process of reducción, an attempt to concentrate in colonial towns
the indigenous population living in dispersed settlements. This process
affected more than one million people, and it aimed to make more effective
the organization and fulfilment of colonial obligations, being both tribute
and mita, as well as to improve evangelization and to impose a cultural
model through European urban life patterns.
11. Richard L. Garner, “Long-Term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America: A Comparative
Analysis of Peru and Mexico”, American Historical Review, 93:4 (1988), pp. 898–935.
12. Various aspects of Potosi’s history have been studied by many authors, whose findings offer a
collective knowledge that has been essential to our article. Otherwise, it would have been neither
possible to cover so many of the subjects necessary to help us understand the early colonial
process, nor to examine all the disparate documentary sources. A recent review can be found in
Paula Zagalsky, “La mita de Potosí: una imposición colonial invariable en un contexto de
múltiples trasformaciones (siglos XVI–XVII; Charcas, Virreinato del Perú)”, Chungara, 46:3
(2014), pp. 375–395. Some of the subjects mentioned in this section have been widely analysed in
Raquel Gil Montero, “Free and Unfree Labour in the Colonial Andes in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries”, International Review of Social History, 56 Special Issue 19, The Joy and
Pain of Work: Global Attitudes and Valuations, 1500–1650 (2011), pp. 297–318.
13. The new phase made possible by amalgam technology implied that the social means of
production were almost completely concentrated in Spanish hands.
14. Peter Bakewell, Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labour in Potosi, 1545–1650
(Albuquerque, NM, 1984). Jeffrey A. Cole, The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian
Labor in the Andes (Stanford, CA, 1985).
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Thirdly, Viceroy Toledo massively monetized the tributary system. This
system calculated the tribute per capita for the male indigenous tributary
population in each repartimiento de indios (fiscal and administrative unit),
but responsibility for payment lay with the caciques.15 This monetized
tribute obliged indigenous people, one way or another, to participate in
commodified relationships, offering their products in the market or
their labour in exchange for money. The labour relationships, even those
mediated by money, could be both voluntary and coercive.16 In order to
achieve these three main goals, Viceroy Toledo developed a fourth measure:
a general visita, or inspection of the Viceroyalty, which recorded the
number of individuals and their resources. The inspection played a key role
in the reconfiguration process and in the imposition of a new order that
involved themita system, the payment of tributes, and the relocation of the
indigenous population to new rural towns.
The characteristics of Potosí’s mine labour system have been widely
studied, so we will merely summarize its central elements here. The Potosí
mita was a state-coordinated form of draft labour, systematically organized
since 1573. Its major objective was to reorganize mine labour according to
royal needs and the increasing political power of the state. Toledo’s mining
mita had pre-Hispanic precedents: the system was inspired by how the
Incas had organized labour. Toledo’s mining mita also had colonial
antecedents taken from the first period of Potosí silver production, then
dominated by native technology known as the huayra stage.17
The mita system established the forced migration to Potosí of a percen-
tage of the male indigenous tributaries, mitayos, and their families for one
year from the sixteen highland corregimientos (provinces) in the region
between Cuzco and the southern border of present-day Bolivia (Figure 1).
In 1575, Toledo determined the percentages of mitayos each region should
send annually: between thirteen per cent and seventeen per cent of their
tributaries. Different viceroys established the annual total, “mita gruesa”,
which varied only during the initial years of the system: between 1573 and
1575, the number ofmitayos varied from about 9,500 to around 11,000; but
from 1578 to the 1680s, it was fixed at around 14,000. The mita
labour system divided the annual contingent into thirds: one-third were
15. In the early colonial period, repartimientos de indioswere groups of native people assigned to
a certain encomendero, so they were fiscal and administrative units. In addition, since the seven-
teenth century they were considered territorial units being parts of a province’s district.
16. Carlos S. Assadourian, “La despoblación indígena en Perú y Nueva España durante el siglo
XVI y la formación de la economía colonial”, Historia Mexicana, 38:3 (1989), pp. 419–453.
17. Idem, “La producción de la mercancía dinero en la formación del mercado interno colonial.
El caso del espacio peruano, siglo XVI”, in Enrique Florescano (ed.), Ensayos sobre el desarrollo
económico en México y América latina (1500–1975) (Mexico, 1979), pp. 223–292. Bakewell,
Miners of the Red Mountain. Gil Montero, “Free and Unfree Labour”.
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obliged to work weekly, while the other two-thirds rested, although only
theoretically.18 Mitayos were obliged to work weekly for a limited number
of Spanish owners of mines and mills.19 In 1575, Viceroy Toledo established
the mita “capitanías” to organize and ensure mitayo labour in Potosí. This
institution appointed native leaders, who were responsible for the mobility
and presence of forced mine labourers. In the beginning, this was a position
of great power and prestige, but by the seventeenth century it had become a
heavy and difficult burden to bear.
The polity fixed the wages of forced labourers at a rate below those
paid to “free” labourers. In theory, wages were paid in money and were
insufficient to ensure the reproduction of labour power. In addition to
wages, mitayos also had resources from their communities of origin, which
thereby subsidized colonial mining production.20 Mitayos women also
contributed to their household economy by working in the urban
markets.21 Apart from paying their tributes (almost ninety per cent of their
income), mitayos were also obliged to contribute part of their wages to pay
the salaries of royal officials, mita captains, and hospitals.22 Finally, they
needed money to pay for their individual and family livelihood, such as
food, clothes, housing, and candles for the mines. Clearly, they had no
choice but to look for other job opportunities as “free” labourers during
their period of “rest”.23 This guaranteed mine owners a permanent supply
of “free” labour.24 Assadourian has estimated that at the beginning of the
seventeenth century – during the mining boom in Potosí – seventy per cent
of the labour force was hired and thirty per cent was forced.25 Hired labour
was important in terms of numbers, particularly in specialized and
better-paid tasks.26 The mita could be fulfilled in person, but substitution
(conmutación) was also permitted. This meant that it was possible to pay a
fixed sum of money for each absent mitayo. With that money, termed
“silver Indian”, it was possible to hire and pay a labourer. However, the
18. This system of “thirds” was not effective and, presumably during the seventeenth century, it
was replaced by one in which the contingent was divided into two (Cole, The Potosí Mita).
19. This system excluded many Spaniards who arrived too “late” to benefit from this source of
labour. Many of those excluded submitted complaints centred on the mita, even questioning it
strongly in the second half of the seventeenth century.
20. Assadourian, “La producción de la mercancía”.
21. Jane Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí
(Durham, NC [etc.], 2005).
22. Assadourian, “La producción de la mercancía”.
23. Bakewell,Miners of the Red Mountain.
24. Assadourian, “La producción de la mercancía”.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., pp. 252–257; Enrique Tandeter, Coacción y mercado. La minería de la plata en el Potosí
colonial, 1692–1826 (Buenos Aires, 1992); Paula Zagalsky, “Trabajadores indígenas mineros en el
Cerro Rico de Potosí. Tras los rastros de sus prácticas laborales (siglos XVI y XVII)”, Revista
Mundos do Trabalho, 6:12 (2014), pp. 55–82.
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money paid in compensation was not always used to hire a replacement;
often it remained in the pockets of the Spanish beneficiaries of the
mita (mine owners and mill owners).
There are two different ways of evaluating the numbers covered by the
mita. On the one hand, we have the official list of annualmitayos, that is the
estimated number of mitayos forced to work in the mines and mills of
Potosí; on the other hand, we can also consider the effective number of
mitayos who really went there and worked. At around 14,000 per annum
the estimated number was very stable until the end of the seventeenth
century, but the effective numbers – information not easily found and not
systematic27 – corresponded closely to silver production: they fell
throughout the century. It was not until the government of Viceroy La
Palata in the late 1680s that the theoretical and effective numbers tended to
coincide (Figure 2).
Only Potosí and a few other mining centres benefited from the mita,
which means that, in almost all other mining camps, hired labour prevailed.
These kinds of labourers quickly increased in number from the last quarter
of the sixteenth century onwards, partly because of growing demand for
specialists in mercury amalgam technology and partly because of the end of
the encomienda system.28 Hired and paid labour, however, did not mean
a modern labour market. The owners of mines and mills organized
their labour force in such a way as to combine mechanisms of attraction,
more-or-less forced recruitment methods, and forced retention of labourers.
The two principal ways of attracting people were the combination
of better wages, something possible in the new rich mines, and the
opportunity labourers had to work for themselves during the weekends.29
Many testimonies and ordinances indicate that the notion of “hired” was
interpreted liberally in relation to mine labour: coercion was very common,
and it was permitted under various circumstances because mining
contributed to the royal “fifth” (quinto) – a tax imposed on silver
production. The Spanish, for example, had the right to take indigenous
people living in the vicinity of their mines and oblige them to work.
27. Tandeter, Coacción y Mercado. Cole, The Potosí Mita.
28. Bakewell,Miners of the Red Mountain.
29. Zulawski suggested that the wages were necessary, but not sufficient, to tempt labourers, and
that they were probably only half of what workers were capable of earning had they been allowed
to prospect for minerals themselves. Ann Zulawski, “Forasteros y yanaconas. La mano de obra de
un centro minero en el siglo XVII”, in Olivia Harris, Brooke Larson, and Enrique Tandeter (eds),
La participación indígena en los mercados surandinos. Estrategias y reproducción social. Siglos XVI
a XX (La Paz, 1987), pp. 159–192. María C. Gavira Márquez, “Reclutamiento y remuneración de
la mano de obra minera en Oruro, 1750–1810”, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 57:1 (2000),
pp. 223–250. Gil Montero, “Free and Unfree Labour”. Raquel Gil Montero, “Mecanismos de
reclutamiento indígena en la minería de plata. Lípez (sur de la actual Bolivia), siglo XVII”,Revista
América Latina en la Historia Económica, 21:1 (2014), pp. 5–30.
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This activity was sometimes known as “hunting”.30 This right was already
enshrined in Toledo’s ordinances.31 There were other practices in relation to
labourers, including the abduction or retention of their wives, and the
pursuit and capture of runaways. There are documents that record the
“sale” by native authorities of labourers; we have treated then as hired
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Figure 2. Tributes, silver production, and the mita, Potosí, 1560–1700.
Sources: Tributes (in pesos) and silver production (in kilos), TePaske (http://www.insidemydesk.
com/hdd.html); mita (number of mitayos), Cole, The Potosí Mita, pp. 41, 72; Tandeter,
Coacción y mercado, pp. 39–48.
30. Gil Montero, “Mecanismos de reclutamiento”.
31. Mining Ordinances, Ordinance III, Francisco de Toledo, Relaciones de los Vireyes y
Audiencias que han gobernado el Perú: Memorial y Ordenanzas de D. Francisco de Toledo, 4 vols
(Lima, 1867), I, p. 274.
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labour. Working in a mine, however, meant the possibility of earning more
money, principally for those who were specialists and could earn better
wages. Many indigenous people acquired technical knowledge relating to
the amalgam process in Potosí, and, with it, they could command higher
wages in new mines such as Oruro and San Antonio de Lípez.32
MITA , TR IBUTE , AND LABOUR: A DISCUSS ION
Toledo’s enduring reforms profoundly changed the colonial reality. In our
article, we stress the relevance of the mita in the organization of labour
relations. This hypothesis is based on the number of people directly forced to
work in the mines andmills, onmita’s role in themining boom at Potosí, and,
principally, on the related migrations that modified the demography of the
Viceroyalty and influenced almost all other forms of labour. The mita also
occupied a central place in official concerns: it was present in debates,
correspondence, and viceroys’ reports, while the tribute lost importance. In
our analysis, we reconsider some classic interpretations, focusing on the
tribute, of the mechanisms that forced native peoples to work in colonial
enterprises. These mechanism, we believe, were very important at the begin-
ning of the colonial period, but over time they lost their centrality because of
the transformation of the economy and society in the Peruvian Viceroyalty.
How did the Spanish oblige native populations to participate in
the colonial economy as labour? Assadourian proposed a number of
interpretations for the colonial period that have profoundly influenced the
historiography,33 and we now re-evaluate them, focusing on labour and
tribute. Assadourian wrote that the tributes indigenous people had to pay
increased significantly, first with the inclusion of the yanaconas in 1566 and
then with the reforms introduced by Viceroy Toledo, who augmented the
value of the tributes each community had to pay and monetized them.34
These reforms pushed native people to sell their labour or goods, thus
stimulating the internal economy and augmenting royal incomes.
Demography and the economy – Assadourian argues – developed in
reverse, at least until 1630. Demography was the limiting factor in the
growth of tributes: the size of the native population fell. This drove the
government to put mining at the centre of its utilitarian politics.35
Assadourian analysed the shipments of silver to Spain and the increase in
royal incomes as indicators of economic growth and of the increase in the
tax burden. In particular, he emphasized the differential pressure on native
32. Gil Montero, “Mecanismos de reclutamiento”.
33. Assadourian, “La despoblación indígena”.
34. Ibid., p. 427.
35. Assadourian, “La despoblación indígena”, p. 427.
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peoples, both in tributes and in labour, betweenMexico and Peru, where the
burden was much worse.
We base our discussion of Assadourian’s hypothesis on TePaske’s
impressive work in collecting data on and interpreting royal income and
expenditure in Spanish America.36 Drawing on his work, we used two sets
of data taken from the records of Potosí’s Caja Real:37 on tribute income
and silver production. Tributes were an explicit component of royal
income, unlike the other obligations that the native people had to fulfil, so
we prioritized the colonial obligation, which can be analysed as serial data
and quantified. We know that other demands were made that are difficult to
quantify. For example, the forced acquisition of goods, where native people
were compelled to buy unnecessary goods sold to them by local authorities
at high prices; services that natives owed to their authorities, such as
transport using their own animals; and food and services they owed to the
priests. These are not included here. The data on silver production were
processed by TePaske, based on the Potosí royal incomes (Figure 2).
We also looked for data on the mita, both theoretical and effective. The
data available are not all of the same quality, but we can observe a general
tendency. Finally, we added information on population (Table 2).
In Potosí, tributes and mining taxes accounted for ninety per cent
of royal income during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.38 Serial data
on both show how they developed differently over time. To explain this
variation, Klein suggested that, in general, the royal fifth tax was linked to
silver production, while tributes followed indigenous demography.39
However, the tribute data show a closer relationship to colonial politics.
We observed four cycles in the tribute series, although a small variation at the
end of the period could be interpreted as a fifth cycle (Table 1). Before Toledo,
tribute income accounts for just thirteen per cent of total income reaching
the royal treasury, and it was not especially important, measured in pesos.
36. The data assembled by TePaske and an important group of researchers are available at: http://
www.insidemydesk.com/hdd.html, last accessed 2 December 2015. Part of the published analysis
starts in 1680. See, for example, Herbert Klein, The American Finances of the Spanish Empire:
Royal Income and Expenditures in Colonial Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, 1680–1809 (Albuquerque,
NM, 1998). For a more extended analysis, see Bernard Slicher van Bath, Real Hacienda y econ-
omía en Hispanoamérica, 1541–1820 (Amsterdam, 1989). For a critical study, see Raquel Gil
Montero, “El tributo andino reinterpretado. El caso del corregimiento de Lípez”, European
Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 99 (2015), pp. 69–88.
37. TheCaja Realwas the royal treasury, which recorded all royal income and expenditure. Some
provinces, and other minor jurisdictions, had one. Potosí’s Caja Real included records not only
for the city, but also for the province (Porco) in which Potosí was located and for other
neighbouring provinces (including Lípez and Chichas).
38. Here, we also included income from quicksilver, which was a monopoly of the Crown. Klein,
The American Finances.
39. Ibid.
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At that point, few repartimientos de indios were paying in Potosí, and those
that did paid infrequently. With Toledo, three important changes occurred: it
was made compulsory for the yanaconas to pay; most of the encomiendas
lapsed and the tributes associated with these rights reverted to the Crown;
and there was an important and successful official effort to oblige all
tributaries to comply with their obligations. Royal incomes increased in a
clear context of population decline, as Assadourian noted.However, from the
beginning of the seventeenth century tributes started to lose their relevance
compared with the mita, not only for the royal treasury, but also for the
authorities. One sees a clear and rapid decrease in tribute income. The fourth
cycle shows relative stability in those incomes, which were at their lowest
level during colonial times, even though the number of repartimientos
obliged to pay the tribute was greater. The last cycle was brief, and showed a
sharp decrease in expected repartimientos and a slight, but significant,
increase in tributes: those were the years of La Palata’s general inspection.40
Toledo’s government marked a period of unprecedented involvement by
the colonial state and its agents, organizing and controlling tributaries.
Their presence led to a temporary increase in tribute income. However, at
that time, the principal concern was to organize the collection of the royal
fifth,41 and so the state stopped pressing indigenous labourers in relation to
tribute and instead continued to press them in relation to the mita. Table 1
shows that, over time, although more repartimientos were obliged to pay
tributes to the Crown, not all of them did so every year. In Potosí, tributes
lost their importance in terms of value, since taxes on mining production
became the chief source of income.
Regarding the demographics of the seventeenth century (the second
factor in Assadourian’s argument), massive migrations in the Andes seemed
to be related to mining activity since a large proportion of the labour force
was directly or indirectly involved in silver production. When it comes
to assessing this relationship, the worst problem we face is that most
of the regional silver boom took place between the two general inspections
(Toledo’s in the 1570s, and La Palata’s in the 1680s) in which the Andes
population was enumerated. A second problem is that those inspections
excluded an important part of the indigenous population living in the
cities that had emerged around centres of silver production. To compensate
for this, we used other evidence that shows the direction of migration
during the seventeenth century (Table 2), and this implies we need
more than Potosí to understand that migration: we also need the mita.
The evidence comprises two observations: first, that it was the
40. The cause of the decrease in the number of repartimientos expected to pay was a reorgani-
zation of the royal treasury: some of the repartimientos started to pay in 1609 in another Caja
Real; some of them disappeared from the official records.
41. The royal fifth accounted for two-thirds of total royal income in Potosí.
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region around Potosí that grew most; and, second, that the provinces
that lost most in terms of population were those obliged to send mitayos.
Mining,mita, and migrations were strongly connected, as many migrants
from the northernmita provinces did not return to their homes, and stayed
in Potosí, as we can see in Table 2, which summarizes the demographic
changes that occurred in the Peruvian Viceroyalty.
To explain the mechanisms developed by the colonial state and that
permitted this kind of migration – probably as an undesired effect – we
propose to separate tributes from other forms of labour, and to
examine what happened between the 1570s and 1680s.42 In some cases,
trends coincided, but in many others they did not. We found three
different situations: one in which some tributaries had to pay their tributes
in money, and they worked to earn this money; another in which they had
to work as forced labourers (mitayos) and to pay their tributes as well;
Table 1. Tributes: royal treasury of Potosí, 1560–1700.
No. of
repartimientos
expected to pay*
No. of repartimientos
that paid each year
(average)
Tributes as
% of total
income
(average)
Tributes: average
total annual
payment (in
pesos ensayados)
1560–1573 20 9 13 37,796
1574–1601 31 19 9 96,349
1602–1626 31 12 5 64,061
1627–1687 38 11 4 38,080
1688–1700 16 11 5 46,509
Source: TePaske (http://www.insidemydesk.com/hdd.html)
*Yanaconas were not included
Table 2.Distribution of indigenous people recorded in the general inspections
of Toledo and La Palata (%)
Regions Toledo (1570s) La Palata (1680s)
Cuzco + Puno + Chucuito 64 32
La Paz 17 27
Charcas 19 41
Sources: Toledo (Noble David Cook, Tasa de la Visita General de Francisco de Toledo
(Lima, 1975)); La Palata (Ignacio González Casasnovas, Las dudas de la corona.
La política de repartimientos para la minería de Potosi (1680–1732) (Madrid, 2000)).
42. Andean historiography generally analysed mita and tributes together with the other
obligations that indigenous people had to pay (in the form of labour for example), regarding them
all as part of the “tribute” they had to pay as Crown subjects. Zagalsky, “La mita de Potosí”.
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and a third in which they sometimes had to work and were not obliged
to pay tributes in money, as was the case with the yanaconas mentioned
earlier.
Regarding tributes, Toledo reinforced a tendency that had already begun
and that might explain the timing of migration: most of the tributes
were paid to the Crown at the royal treasury and not to the private sector
encomenderos. This was a consequence of Crown policy, started in the
1560s, to eliminate the social, political, and material power of the
encomenderos. As a result, indigenous people were no longer subject to
a particular beneficiary, a situation that allowed labour to migrate and to be
recruited for the most important activity benefiting the Crown: mining. In
this context, Philip II said about the mine labourers: “The profit that one of
these natives [mine labourer] generates is greater than that given by twenty
tributaries”.43 Mobility disfavoured the control that native authorities had
on their people and thus affected the payment of tributes. However,
although the officials knew from the beginning about the decrease in these
incomes and about the massive migration, they took no action until the
arrival of La Palata in the 1680s.
Geographical mobility was, and still is, important in the mine labour
world. We believe that two factors permitted and promotedmobility during
the seventeenth century: the fact that the tributes were paid to the Crown,
and not to private individuals; and the organization of the mita. Becoming
royal tributaries, without personal links to a particular Spaniard, allowed
indigenous caciques, groups, and people to “choose” where to sell their
labour or goods, and to earn money to fulfil their obligations. Further, the
power that Potosí mine owners and the authorities had at that time allowed
them to prioritize themita, arguing that it helped them to increase the royal
fifth. This had a practical result: tributes decreased dramatically during this
period, but the authorities took no action.
There were two types of labour: one mobile and one attached to the land.
The first group, people affected by the mita, who fled – either to avoid the
obligation or to find money for a substitute – provided labour for various
activities that did not rely on forced labour: these activities included work
on estates, in other mining centres, and in the transportation of goods
to supply the important urban market that was developing during the
seventeenth century. The second group was established by the agricultural
estates, which promoted greater geographical stability for labourers, using a
range of mechanisms to bind them to the land. One such mechanism
involved Spanish landowners paying the tributes to the Crown and the
indigenous labourers being indebted to them in return. Another involved
43. Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú (Lima, 1978), p. 46. Our
translation.
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landowners attracting or accepting fugitive tributary natives, who became
yanaconas, thus establishing a personal relationship with the Spanish and
becoming less free to move.
There has been a conflicting debate about the demographic crisis at the
end of our period, in the 1680s and 1690s. On the one hand, the royal
authorities claimed that the principal cause of the decrease in tribute income
and in the number of mitayos was the indigenous people running away
and avoiding their colonial obligations. On the other hand, indigenous
organizers of themita in Potosí maintained that people were obliged to flee
from their rural towns because of abuse by the caciques, the local Spanish
authorities, and because their lands had been sold. Moreover, during the
seventeenth century, further burdens were added to the existing ones –
tributes andmita – already imposed on the natives. One of these became the
most important: the forced acquisition of goods, sold by local Spanish
authorities to the natives, from the first half of the seventeenth century.
Indigenous people were forced to buy non-useful and very expensive goods
sold by the local authorities, a practice legalized by the Crown in the 1750s.
This practice had its origins in the seventeenth century, when the Crown
began to sell official positions, especially that of local governor. The
appointee then attempted to recover the money paid to the Crown by
selling goods to the tributaries.
Although beyond our period, a description of what happened during
the eighteenth century helps to put the previous two centuries into a
broader context. According to various sources, during the first half
of the eighteenth century mita substitution and the compulsory purchase
of goods by indigenous people were the most oppressive obligations
for the royal tributaries. In this context, royal officials also made
various attempts to oblige indigenous people to pay their tributes
regularly.44 In the context of the new reforms introduced by the Crown,
the native response to all these pressures was the increase in violence
that began in the 1740s, culminating in massive rebellion during the 1780s.
The compulsory purchase of goods was subsequently forbidden, and the
way tributes were paid was radically reformed: people had to pay per capita,
and the tribute payable was related to their place of residence and not
their place of origin. The indirect forms of labour control discussed earlier
lost much of their significance. As a result, in the late 1780s, for the first time
in the colonial history of Charcas, the value of the tribute collected by
the royal officials exceeded that of silver production. The importance of the
44. The context was actually more complex than this. See Sergio Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial
Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes (Durham, 2003).
The Bourbonmonarchs made important reforms during the second half of the eighteenth century
whichmodified the so-called colonial pact and significantly affected the local population (not only
the indigenous people).
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tribute grew significantly and became the main source of Crown income in
the Andes.
COLONIAL POLICIES AND SHIFTS IN LABOUR
RELATIONS
In presenting our case study of the definitions of labour relations proposed
by the Collab, we want to stress, first, that all the labour relations we have
noted existed in a colonial context. This context influenced all labour rela-
tions, especially those of indigenous peoples. Second, we use the term
“state” in a broader sense, as proposed by the editors, and, of course, as
distinct from the “nation state”. During colonial times in Spanish America,
political power was devolved to various decentralized poles, often with
conflicting interests. However, there was a significant difference between
what we have called private individuals and the authorities, although in
many cases they were one and the same. Third, one of the characteristics of
the relationship between conquerors and natives was the role of indirect
rule. This characteristic partly explains the survival of Andean commu-
nities, because they maintained their right to organize themselves – at least
at some levels – and retained part of their original lands and resources – in
theory – as long as they fulfilled their colonial obligations, namely tribute
andmita. Platt proposed the notion of “pact” to understand this relationship.45
In what follows, we analyse each tributary category using the
Collaboratory’s taxonomy (Figure 3). Broadly speaking, almost all the
population living on communal land were household producers, leading
and kin, at least part of the year. In addition, and because of their
reciprocal relationships, they also had to fulfil communal obligations, such
as tribute and mita. Then, part of the year and sometimes during a whole
year, a percentage of the tributaries and their families migrated to Potosí to
work in the mines or mills, or they went elsewhere to earn the money
they needed to meet their communal obligations. People belonging to a
community (i.e. everybody except the yanaconas and those we have termed
“free” indigenous people) had to fulfil jointly all the many obligations, as we
have seen above, and not just the tributes. The cacique was responsible for
fulfilling these obligations to the colonial authorities. Some wealthier groups
or people were able to avoid selling their labour: instead, they sold their
goods in urban markets, went as merchants to various parts of the
Viceroyalty, or had enough llamas to transport their goods or those of others.
All the relationships we have noted in the previous paragraph were
within the ethnic group; however, indigenous peoples also had labour
relations with the Spanish. In the mita system, for example, we find a
combination of inter- and intra-ethnic relations. On the one hand, there
45. Tristan Platt, Estado boliviano y ayllu andino (Lima, 1982).
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were the colonial obligations all indigenous peoples had as Crown subjects
that legitimized the state-coordinated form of draft labour organized by
Viceroy Toledo for the benefit of individual Spaniards; on the other, there
was the asymmetrical reciprocal relationship indigenous people had with
their native authority, which forced them to fulfil their obligations. All
indigenous individuals were Crown subjects, but this relationship was
mediated by their native authorities.
Although mita was not tributary labour in the sense proposed by the
Collaboratory – because the polities did not benefit directly, as the mines
were exploited not by the state but by individual Spaniards – initially only
royal authorities had the power to force indigenous people to migrate and
to work in mining, coordinated through their caciques. The benefit to
the Crown was indirect: indigenous labour produced silver, and, owing to
the royal fifth tax paid by private silver producers, this was the main source
of the increase in royal income.
The state regulated the amount of money that mitayos received for
their labour from individual Spaniards. This amount was less than the
wages paid to hired labourers, and when the mita was first organized it
was calculated per day. However, during the seventeenth century the
miners regulated the mitayo’s weekly work, imposing a production
quota, and the money they actually received was therefore less than the
level theoretically set by the state. As mitayos they had to pay their
tribute, for their food, all the equipment needed for their work,
for the hospital, and the salaries of their priests and of the colonial
authorities.
Figure 3. Overview of labour relations during the seventeenth century, Charcas.
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There were various types of indigenous people involved in Potosí’s
mining activities: forced labourers (mitayos) as well as “hired” labourers
and yanaconas belonging to the Crown. All of them were Crown subjects,
although not all were obliged to work in the mines. Why did indigenous
people who were not mitayos go to Potosí or to other mines? Colonial
relationships explain this. For example, Spanish miners had the right to
oblige a small number of indigenous people living close to their mines to
work there, just because they were Crown subjects. In other mining centres
in south Charcas we found people who had been forced to stay, by being
locked inside a room for the night, or because their wives and children were
prevented from leaving.46
What we have here called “hired” labourers were people who went to the
mines, attracted by the incomes they could earn there. They were usually
“well-paid” skilled labourers, though it would be more accurate to say
“better paid”; they were sometimes the same mitayos, working in their free
time. Although they were free to move to other places and mines, they were
not really free to decide to stay in their communities if they wanted. They
could also be obliged to stay in a mining camp against their will. As we have
already seen, they, too, had to find money to pay their obligations and not
only for their survival: their reciprocal relationships with their communities
“forced” them to go.
Among the yanaconas, we found no indirect rule, as they had no
reciprocal obligations to their communities. However, they were also
Crown subjects. In almost all mining centres, there were three different
types of yanaconas: some worked for particular individuals (as a kind
of servant), others for themselves (forced only to pay the tribute to
the Crown), while others worked for the church (and paid tribute to
the Crown).
There were also indigenous peoples living in places other than the
communal lands, mines, and estates we have described.Many of them lived in
the cities, sometimes with strong relationships to their communities, through
paying their tributes, sending money for the mita substitute, or for other
reasons; there was sometimes no such relationship. The latter were “free”
indigenous people, who did not recognize a native authority, who did not
work for a Spaniard, fixed to the land as yanaconas, and who did not pay
tribute. They lived, avoiding obligations, on the margins, but they played a
role in the colonial economy as traders ormuleteers; sometimes, theyworked
in peripheral lands or mines, or as highland pastoralists. In the seventeenth
century they were few in number, but by no means insignificant.
In summarizing the role of the state in labour relations, we would
stress some of the factors that defined those relations. The first is that all
46. Gil Montero, “Mecanismos de reclutamiento”.
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indigenous people were subjects of the Spanish Crown, and that allowed
private individuals and various authorities to force them to work. The state
defined many of the tasks that almost all tributaries living in communal
lands had to perform. They were also obliged, by the state, to send some of
their men to work in specific mines andmills, and to pay their tributes to the
Crown. The state set the wages that mitayos received and, in general, all
obligations relating to this particular form of labour. Other non-official
obligations, such as paying for their substitutes in the mita, or buying the
obligatory goods sold to them by the local governor, could be considered
indirect methods to force them to acquire money, through the sale of their
labour or goods. Finally, the passive role of the authorities was also
important: for example, like the encomenderos before them, royal officials
did not control the tribute indigenous people had to pay to the Crown, or
their spatial movements.
CONCLUSIONS
Right from the beginning of the conquest, the Spanish took advantage of the
Inca’s organization of labour. However, in a colonial context labour
relations changed significantly. The architect of the changes that affected
those relations until the end of the eighteenth century, and, in some respects,
until independence, was Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. In this article,
we have stressed four aspects of his reforms that were important for the
new configuration of labour relations: the organization of the mita, the
extinction of the encomiendas, the increase in the amount each community
had to pay, and the obligation to pay in money. The reforms freed the
tributaries from their encomenderos and permitted the massive migrations
that took place from the seventeenth century onwards.
Why would a native leave his land and work for the conquerors?
The historiography traditionally argues that the increase in the tribute, and
the obligation to pay it in money, forced them to migrate and to look for
ways to earn money in order to pay it. This is, of course, part of the answer.
However, we have seen that there were also indigenous people who
were not obliged to pay, but instead required to work for the Spaniards
(yanaconas); further, the obligations involved more than paying tributes,
and the other obligations were sometimes more important. It was the
colonial relationship indigenous people had with the Crown that
legitimized the different forms of direct and indirect coercion.
Direct coercion was exerted, for example, through the mita system, and
through some royal labour regulations. Indirect coercion is more difficult
to identify. Indigenous peoples, and, more specifically, those peoples of
more limited means, were forced to leave their land and to look for ways to
earn money to fulfil their colonial obligations. There were at least three
reasons for this: the need to pay for substitutes for the mita, the obligation
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to buy goods sold by the local governors, and the tributes themselves. The
latter lost their importance during the seventeenth century, while the first
two became more important. Regarding the Collaboratory’s taxonomy, we
want to stress that, although the state regulated the tasks and identity of
labourers, the major beneficiaries were private individuals.
Why did indigenous peoples fulfil their obligations? The key factor was
indirect rule: those natives belonging to a community wanted to retain their
rights by collaborating with their communities, paying their tributes, and
meeting all other obligations. In exchange, they could organize their own
government and keep their lands.
Natives who did not belong to a community, typically the yanaconas, did
not have reciprocal labour relations and communal obligations. Some of
them had inherited their yanacona status and worked for a Spaniard right
from the start of the conquest. Some had tried to escape their obligations,
principally themita, by running away and ended up as yanaconas on estates
or working in other enterprises. Royal officials did not force them to return
to their communities, partly because there were an increasing number of
Spanish landowners and mining entrepreneurs who did not have the
advantage of forced labour – such as the mitayos – and who therefore
needed such labour.
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